A Durkheimian Theory of Social Movements

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Abstract

This article provides a theory of social movements that draws on Durkheim and network theory. The article maintains that a social movement's success depends on promoting a social (rather than an individual) form of consciousness. Its existence depends on whether there are multiplex links between the leaders and the followers (Durkheim's moral density); and whether its ideological frame resonates with those of other movements, and is not perceived as incompatible with values generally held by society. If this is the case, the movement's frame may become known to the members of other social movements, and may be viewed by them as a legitimate and taken-for-granted alternative in the ideological landscape. Three examples are provided to illustrate this theory..They concern the civil rights movement, occupy Wall Street and the Social Democratic Movement in Imperial Germany. In all these cases, the ability to achieve the social movements' ends has been predicated on their leaders' ability to establish social and ideological relations not only between followers, but also with other social movements and the external social environment.

Keywords: social movements, social form of consciousness, moral density

1. Introduction

1.1 Useless Durkheim?

Whether Durkheim has contributed to a theory of social movements, and to which extent, has been debated. This debate may be conducive to more general questions, such as: Is it possible to derive a theory of social movements from Durkheimian writings? If such a theory may be formulated, how does it relate to Network, Frame, Resource Mobilization, and Strain theories? Does it provide an account of social movements that compares favorably in some respects with other theoretical frameworks? The article intends to contribute not only to Durkheimian scholarship, but also to the study of social movements. It briefly presents this debate, and subsequently considers the related general questions in some detail. A publication by Charles Tilly titled Useless Durkheim (Tilly 1981) started the discussion. According to Tilly, Durkheim argued that large-scale social change ensuing from advanced division of social labor causes individual and collective disorder or anomie, the more so the more social change is rapid and comprehensive. As Tilly has contended, this argument is "either circular or extraordinarily difficult to translate into verifiable propositions" (Tilly 1981: 108), since the Durkheimian argument concerns the effects of industrialization and rapid social change in the unique historical case of nineteenth-century Europe and the United States, and should not be assumed to be a general consequence of social change.

It has been remarked, however, that Tilly and the literature on resource mobilization in general have overstated their criticism of Durkheim, and that Durkheim's argument is vindicated to the extent that "breakdown … prerequisite to breakout" (Piven, Cloward 1992: 314). Breakdown - it has been pointed out - may take place in a variety of historical contingencies, and may be enacted by a variety of social actors, (Piven, Cloward 1992). It has also been maintained, in disagreement with Tilly and other interpreters of Durkheim, that Durkheim's historical-comparative sociology is based upon "relational, network-analytic modes of thinking" at different levels of analysis. Durkheim deemed "a multiplicity of elements" instrumental to "shaping the empirical social action" (Emirbayer 1996: 109, 124-125). Culture, social structure, and social psychology provide the environments that guide and channel social action. Actors interpret and provide meaning to their actions both in their routine social life and in exceptional periods of creative effervescence. By doing so, they create, maintain, and change their collective consciousness (Emirbayer 1996).

These objections to Tilly's thesis generally acknowledge Durkheim's potential contribution to a strain and breakdown theory of collective movements (Buechler 2004: 48; see also Smelser 1962). Tilly's critics maintain, however, that a

social state of consciousness or collective consciousness, as Durkheim called it, is a condition opposite of strain and breakdown, for is characterized by a set of shared moral and religious beliefs and practices, and is worth investigating on these grounds. Their criticisms may be conducive to a consideration of a Durkheimian theory of social movements, which should investigate the causes and consequences of this state of consciousness, with particular reference to social solidarity. The first part of the article will formulate some theoretical statements concerning the conditions and consequences of a social state of consciousness. In the following sections a distinction will be made between, on the one hand, social and individual forms of consciousness, on the other, specific and shared. A theoretical context for this Durkheimian theory is then provided. Theories bearing on frame, social identity, networks and social capital, resource mobilization, and strain, are briefly discussed in this connection. The different impact of the American Civil Rights movement, Occupy Wall Street, and the Social Democratic movement in Imperial Germany on their political, social and cultural environments will provide an illustration of this theory.

1.2 A Durkheimian Theory of Social Movements

According to Durkheim, there is a reciprocal relationship between collective actions and a social form of consciousness. On the one hand, by acting together people who are gathered for some common purpose experience society as a collective force, and as a result invigorate their social sentiments. Hence, their shared symbols and representations, their social bonds and collective consciousness, are strengthened. On the other hand, an already existing social consciousness makes these gatherings possible, and in fact demands them to provide a given collectivity with its moral foundation, and ultimately, make thereby its duration possible (Durkheim 1998a: 326-327, 330-331, 461, 610-612). Their challenge of "a specific form of stability" does not involve in this case "throwing the collectivity into a normless condition" (Ruggero, Montagna 2008: 9). If the division of social labor is advanced, some occupational subgroups may produce a collective consciousness of their own not compatible with that of society.

This occurs if these subgroups are at loggerheads, do not have regular contacts with each other, and no common organization exerts authority and supplies a regulatory framework to their relations. As shown by the workers' and manufacturers' associations, no feeling of solidary interests binds these subgroups together, even though they may belong to the same industrial sector and have contractual relations. They prefer to pursue their own parochial interests without regard to the consequences for society. Anomie prevails as a consequence of this condition. Society is fragmented in a number of morally isolated individuals and subgroups. Instances of such subgroups, on which Durkheim dwells to some extent, are the workers' associations in different economic sectors, and the corresponding associations of manufacturers.

This condition results from the absence of frequent, ordered, and multiplex relations between the individuals partaking in the division of labor, and also between their associations (Durkheim 1998b: VII-VIII, 358-360). As we shall see presently, a movement's success is predicated on its ability to preserve itself and achieve its objectives of cultural, social and political change, even if only in the long run and disregarding the movement's intended impact. The following theoretical statements indicate a set of necessary (not sufficient) conditions for successful social movements:

1. *No social movement can preserve itself, and achieve its objective to transform society, if it fails to establish strong social and moral bonds between participants.*

2. *Strong social and moral bonds between participants may be established if they gather regularly to perform ceremonies or rituals that are endowed with symbolic significance, and in which common beliefs, ideas, notions and sentiments are created, exchanged, and reaffirmed.*

3. *No social movement can transform society if it fails: a) to establish with other groups, including those with whom conflict is conducted, a stable network of relations; b) to link its own values, ideas and sentiments to those of other groups, including the groups with whom conflict is conducted, and society as a whole.*

Therefore:

4. *No social movement can achieve a transformation of society if participants and their subgroups do not have multiplex and meaningful links with other individuals, other subgroups, and society as a whole.*

These theoretical propositions imply that social movements are inherently conflict-oriented, as they endeavor to transform society or uphold it against some challenge. This endeavor is constitutive of social movements, as indicated by current definitions of this concept (Della Porta, Diani 1997: 29; 2006: 20-23; Klandermans 1997: 2-3; Snow, Soule, Kriesi 2004: 11). Durkheim referred to conflicts between the social classes of the workers and manufacturers, that is, to industrial conflicts and the so-called old social movements. Their existence was imputed to unequal social and economic relations between these two contractual partners (Durkheim 1998b: 367-382). The theory may however apply to social movements in general. It calls attention to the presence of the following conditions, which are necessary to the success of social movements, and also sufficient if jointly considered: a) Periodically held meetings, which participants

endow with symbolic significance; b) Stable associations between individuals sharing a common interest, such as pursuing the same occupation; c) Multiplex and stable links connecting members of social movements, and their subgroups, with other individuals, subgroups, and society as a whole; d) Movements' actions and goals compatible with widely held norms and values, although the movements propose and endeavor to perform cultural, social and legal innovations, and have norms and values of their own.

According to the theory, social movements have goals, values and identities, which they create and reaffirm through periodical and highly significant gatherings. They might be able to achieve - at least to some extent - their goals, and preserve their norms and values, if they maintain multiplex links with the external environment, and if their norms, values, and worldviews are not completely opposed to those prevailing in the environment. This Durkheimian theory is not however interested in describing or explaining the outcomes and consequences of social movements' collective action, albeit outcomes and consequences are often considered indicators of a movement's success (Giugni 1998: 385-386; Polletta, Jasper 2001: 296-297). Success is here broadly defined as the movement's contribution to society's moral density, rather than narrowly as the movement's impact (its outcomes and consequences) according to its leaders' intentions.

Rather than attainment of a movement's goals and self-preservation, changes in some properties of societal networks conducive to greater moral density are considered indicators of success in this case. Indicators of success, so defined, are increases in the number of ties, their multiplexity, the network density, and the number of links, which actors consider significant in terms of commitment and/or salience. The theory does not consider the actors' intentions. It is not accordingly affected by this methodological problem, which is instead inherent to the narrow definition of success (Della Porta, Diani 2006: 227-229).

1.3 Social and Individual Forms of Consciousness

A social form of consciousness prevails over an individual form. In Durkheim's own words, "the states of collective consciousness [*conscience collective*] are of a different nature than those of individual consciousness", since the mentality of groups is unlike and depends on distinct conditions than that of individuals (Durkheim 2002a: xvii). Collective consciousness consists in "a system of ideas, sentiments and habits that express in ourselves … the group, or different groups, of which we partake". "Collective consciousness" (or "social thought") is contrasted with its opposite, individual consciousness, also designated by Durkheim as individual selfishness ("égoïsme individuel") (Durkheim 2002b: 439). Individual consciousness consists in "all those mental states that only relate to ourselves and the events of our personal life" (Durkheim 2003: 102; see also pp. 51, 73, 103). Collective consciousness is expressed by means of "collective representations". These are "forces that are more active and effective than individual representations" (Durkheim 1998a: 327, note 1), and have a moral nature, as by indicated their sources and effects. On the one hand, these forces "are constituted by those ideas and sentiments which society's spectacle awakens in us, rather than sensations originating from the physical world" (Durkheim 1998a: 461). On the other hand, these forces exert a moral pressure on their component elements (Durkheim 1998a: 571, 610). Durkheim's distinction between the two forms of consciousness involves the following contrapositions:

1) Choices made by isolated and self-centered individuals; or resulting from interactions between associated individuals who form a psychic unity, and are endowed with a way of thinking and feeling of its own. 2) Choices inspired by preoccupations of advantages or disadvantages to the actors or to others; or made in disregard to such considerations, but with regard to collective groupings to whom those making the choice belong. 3) Choices that do not conform, or do conform, to social interests of primary importance. Society's chief interest, and ultimately the individuals' as well, is to uphold its moral constitution. Choices of the former type follow short-lived individual interests. In contrast, those of the latter type conform to social interests, since they increase social solidarity, which results from a "network of ties" (*réseau de liens*) (Durkheim 1998b: 395) binding both individuals and collective actors. They also conform to individual interests in the long run, for they promote the individuals' complexity, hence their endurance in modern complex societies. A social form of consciousness involves compromises between individuals having different interests, which originate from the division of social labor (Durkheim 1997: 137-138; 1998a: 296-297, 453, 497, 525, 530; 1998b: 101, 175-176, 180-18, 191, 264, 339, 342, 401-403; 2002a: 120-122; 2002b: 314, 325, 350, 406-407).

These Durkheimian contrapositions anticipate, and may also contribute to, some theses formulated in the contemporary literature on social movements. Considerations of individual costs and benefits may have some relevance for participation (Zald 1992: 332-333, 341-342), but rational evaluations on the part of actual or would-be members should not be overemphasized (Della Porta, Diani 2006: 16). Participating may be rational from the participants' viewpoint point in terms of advantages accruing from it, but participation prompted by moral obligations and enduring affective emotions may be deemed more significant than considerations of individual convenience (Goodwin, Jasper, Polletta 2004; Schwartz, Paul 1992: 214). Solidary or collective identity incentives - rather than selective incentives intended to

stimulate individual participation - account for the decision to join the movement. The movement is thereby preserved from the free-rider problem (Buechler 1993: 227-229; Friedman, McAdam 1992: 161-169; Klandermans 2004: 364; McAdam, McCarthy, Zald 1988: 707; Marx Ferree 1992; Schwartz, Paul 1992: 214-215).

With reference to these theses, Durkheim would have observed, however, that solidary incentives are incompatible with considerations of individual convenience. These considerations may in fact prove a hindrance to participation. An individual and a social form of consciousness cannot, therefore, both prevail at any given time in the same collectivity. A social form of consciousness designates a psychic unity, which involves the existence of a collective identity as a necessary and preliminary component. "From the combination of the individual consciousnesses social life results and is thereby explained. … The representations, emotions, collective tendencies have as their generative" (Durkheim 2002a: 103, 105).

The social form of consciousness, which is specific to a social movement, supplies it with its collective identity. In Durkheim's language, a social form of consciousness is a social fact, rather than psychological or social psychological. It is not, therefore, a process taking place in the individuals' consciousness. For "a social movement is in place only when collective identities develop" (Della Porta, Diani 2006: 21). Contemporary scholarship on social movements has generally maintained a social-psychological view of collective identity, as an interactional accomplishment performed by participants in conjunction with other actors (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994: 189-190). A collective identity has been variously defined (cf. Friedman, McAdam 1992: 169; Hunt, Benford 2004: 440; Polletta, Jasper 2001: 285; Snow, McAdam 2000: 42). A collective identity has been considered as a process that enables movement members to recognize themselves, and be recognized by others, as "part of broader groupings", to whom "emotional attachments" are developed (Della Porta, Diani 2006: 91; see also Stryker 2000: 24).

All these definitions or conceptions of collective identity impinge on social-psychological processes which affect the individual consciousnesses. However, in keeping with Durkheim's conception of a social movement, shared by some contemporary students of social movements, a movement has an existence of its own, which originates from processes of "aggregation, penetration, and merging" of the individual consciousnesses (Durkheim 2002a: 103). Their sociological nature ensues from an "intimate union with social phenomena" (Durkheim 2002a: 111 and note 1); namely, with phenomena - such as collective sentiments - that concern collective life (Durkheim 1997: 110). Sociological processes, which emerge in the course and by means of such assemblies, and which participants endow with emotional and cognitive significance, are autonomous from perceptions, sentiments, and actions that have given rise to them ((Melucci 1995: 46-47; Sawyer 2002: 244-245; Shilling, Mellor 1998: 196-198). Durkheim laid stress on the consequences flowing from the objective existence of a social movement, aside from the social-psychological conditions or circumstances that have promoted its formation.

Specific and shared forms of consciousness. Anomie as a micro- and macro social problem, which occurs when these sources are inadequate or absent (Marks 1975: 357-358), point to the existence of two social forms of consciousness to be found in a successful movement: the former specific and distinctive, the latter shared with the external environment. The participants' recruitment, solidarity, and commitment depend on the mobilization or creation of a collective identity (Polletta, Jasper 2001: 288-292). This includes among its constitutive elements those "concepts, ideas, and intellectual activities" that provide participants with their "cognitive identity" (Eyerman, Jamison 1991: 3). As a consequence of these processes, there is a "(often implicit) agreed-upon definition of membership, boundaries, and activities for the group" (Johnston, Laraña, Gusfield 1994: 15).

Collective identities differ from social identities, which are provided by already existing and relatively stable social roles (Snow 2001: 2, 5-6). They also differ from individual or personal identities. Defined as "self-designations and self-attributions regarded as personally distinctive" (Snow 2001: 2), or "self-cognitions tied to roles and thus to positions in organized social relations" (Stryker 2000: 28), they do not necessarily overlap with the movement's collective identity (Snow, McAdam 2000: 47-49).

Durkheim pointed to the conditions conducive to a successful social movement. These conditions concern the strength and nature of ties not only between participants, but also between the movement and its social and political environment. Durkheim's position in this regard, as set forth in several of his works, was that occupational groups - workers' unions, for example - exert a specific societal effect, or function, if the following conditions are fulfilled.

Occupational groups must be sufficiently proximate to their members to be aware of, and sympathetic with, their needs. They must also keep in check the members' strong desires (*convoitises*), whose social impact is potentially destructive, by reminding them of the general interest and reciprocal duties (Durkheim 1998b: xi-xii. See also Durkheim 1997: 67, 137-138; 1998b: xvii-xviii; 2002b: 440-442; 2003: 95; Nisbet 1974: 142-143; Pope, Johnson 1983: 684). However, according to Durkheim, the societal impact of occupational groups is ambivalent. On the one hand, occupational groups would not pursue ends compatible with public morals if left to fend for themselves for the sake of their parochial

interests ("égoïsme corporatif", as Durkheim designated this form of collective behavior). Society would be then composed of separated segments, which would contain their members' actions. Anomie, which would follow therefrom, is in Durkheim's view as socially pernicious as the prevalence of an individual state of consciousness (Durkheim 2002b: 439-440).

On the other hand, groups, which interact among themselves, coalesce and form a larger group, possibly as large as society as a whole. The constituent parts would preserve their individuality, but society's (in Durkheim's language) "dynamic" or "moral" density - namely, the great frequency of interactions both between individuals and groups - would extend the circle of those participating in common life, and intensify their participation. This process is conducive to democracy, as Durkheim argues. Groups - in addition to an integrative function - fulfill the function of preventing the State, which is society's political organization, from exerting tyranny over the individuals, as they constitute powerful collective forces that may counterweigh State power, while the State may exert its regulatory powers over them. They may also prevent particularistic concerns of private citizens from finding political expression, as groups can be instrumental to organize public opinion. Finally, occupational groups may intermediate between the single citizens and the State. To this end, these institutions must be democratic, and therefore amenable to an exchange of ideas, sentiments and resolutions with the population at large (1997: 51-52, 54-55, 97-99, 114-117, 125-129, 137-139; 1998b: 237-238, 264-266 and note 4, 435-439; 2002a: 112-115 and note 1, 113; 2002b: 439-442).

A movement's success implies therefore not only a direct impact on policies, legislation, participants and the environment, but also an indirect one, mediated by a great number of multiplex and meaningful ties movement members have with other individuals and groups. Also, success involves an indirect and presumably unintended impact on the State's regulatory powers, to the benefit of the groups thus affected, other groups, and society as a whole (See in this connection Lukes 1975: 272-274).

Society's benefit, as well as that of other groups and their individual members, would probably be neither intended, nor even envisaged, by any given movement or group. Still, as Durkheim has argued, the benefit would be remarkable. For, the strengthening of civil and political society would overcome the social problems, which are caused by the prevalence of an individual state of consciousness, or the insufficient coordination between the social groups (Durkheim 1998b: 356-357, 439-442. Social fragmentation ensues instead, and is maintained, when there is little or no mutual interaction between the components of civil and political society, and little or no mutual legitimacy of activities and ideas.

Whether effective collective action may take place in those circumstances is doubtful, as "disruptive tactics force concessions … by exacerbating electoral dissensus during periods when electoral divisions are already widening" (Piven, Cloward 1992: 320-321). Moreover, strain and breakdown remain broad "background factors that could promote an equally wide range of responses" (Buechler 2004: 63). According both to Durkheim and some contemporary students of social movements, social fragmentation (an indicator of strain) is then not necessarily conducive to collective action, and at any rate collective action is probably ineffective under these circumstances.

2. A Theoretical Context

The theory, which has been here outlined, is in agreement with, but distinct from, current conceptual and theoretical developments in the study of social movements such as frame, network, resources mobilization, and strain theories. This Durkheimian theory shares with frame theory a focus on "frames". Frames are interpretative schemata used by individuals in order to perceive and describe events (Goffman 1974: 24), and also "to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective" (Snow et al. 1986: 464). As shared interpretive schemata, frames have been viewed as interactional and continuous accomplishments necessary to participate in social movements. As "systems of shared beliefs" (Klandermans 1997: 62), moreover, they justify their existence. Frames, in particular, may be applied by participants in a social movement to interpret their social state of consciousness, previously defined as a set of moral and religious beliefs and practices, and behave accordingly. They also indicate why they are unjust, and what should be done to redress them (Snow, Benford 1989: 12-13; 1992: 137). What is considered unjust, and its reputed causes and remedies, are drawn from a given cultural stock (Zald 1996: 268-269), but social movements - as the term has been used here - are not consensus movements (McCarthy, Wolfson 1992: 274-278).

This Durkheimian theory is also related to network theory, with which it shares some propositions. Properties of the network of social relations (multiplexity of ties, number of links in general and significant links in particular, network density, absence of cliques) indicate the moral density of a society. Networks may provide their members with the benefits of integration and regulation (Pescosolido, Georgianna 1986: 45). Multiplex connections, moreover, greatly facilitate communication between leaders or activists of the social movement and outside individuals or organizations (Della Porta, Diani 1997: 138-142; 2006: 115-117; Diani 2004: 348-349), and are therefore important for the success of the social movement. If frame and network theories are considered jointly, the following statements may be formulated. Firstly, a successful social movement is able to exploit its multiplex links, whether individual or organizational, in order

to make its frame known to and recruit others, or at least have them as sympathetic bystanders. Secondly, a variety of instruments may serve this purpose: frame bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation (Snow et al. 1986; Snow, McAdam 2000: 49-53); the use of master frames relevant to other social movements (Snow, Benford 1989: 15-16; 1992: 141); and the attribution of collective identities to opponents, uncommitted observers, and actual or potential supporters (Hunt, Benford, Snow 1994).

This Durkheimian theory integrates frame and network theories in some respects. Firstly, it draws attention to the importance, for the success of the movement, of seeking resonance with the dominant political culture. This may be achieved by focusing on "specific issue domains" (Gamson, Meyer 1996: 285), with which it is familiar, and creating bridges with, and extensions or amplifications of, frames already present there (Tarrow 1992: 190). Also relevant is a frame that resonates with some component (values, norms, beliefs) of other frames or master frames, even if not with the prevailing consensus. Formulating elaborated master frames that resonate "with the life world of adherents and constituents as well as bystanders" (Snow, Benford 1988: 16; 1992: 140) is not sufficient for a movement to be successful.

Two additional conditions are necessary. The movement's master frame should not be generally perceived by other groups, and the public opinion at large, as radically opposed to their own frames, as would be the case - for instance - of groups posing a threat to public security. Moreover, multiplex links available to the leadership and followers should be instrumental to make the movement's frame known to other movements, and viewed by them as a legitimate and taken-for-granted alternative in the ideological landscape. Value and belief amplification of the movement's frame (Snow et al. 1986: 469-472) may concur in obtaining this result. But even if this process of frame transformation does not occur, the availability of multiplex links should enable the movement to achieve and maintain an ongoing structural and ideological two-way relationship to its social, cultural, and political environment.

Secondly, the theory emphasizes the structure and meanings of relations between the movement and the outside environment. The theory is structural, in the sense that it shares with structural accounts of recruitment "the assumption that structural proximity to a movement, rather than any individual disposition, produces activism" (Friedman, McAdam 1992: 158), and thereby new followers. Irrespective of whether solidarity is based solely on morality, or on morals and shared interests as members of the same occupational group (Pope, Johnson 1983: 684-685), the social order is viewed in Durkheimian terms as "a moral or normative ordering of interpersonal conduct" (Tiryakian 1978: 217). Meanings of relations with outside individuals, organizations and movements are considered relevant. In conformance to Symbolic Interactionism, networks are here conceived of "as a set of relationships which people imbue with meaning and use for personal and collective purposes" (Fine, Kleinman 1983: 97).

Stress is laid, especially, on the consequences for the movement of "identity convergence or divergence across community, movement, and SMO [Social Movement Organization] levels" (Stoecker 1995: 112, 123). For, in keeping with Durkheim, overlapping networks promote a social state of consciousness. "Mutual solidarity" and "circulation of information, resources, expertise" (Diani 2004: 348) flow as a consequence, but also general trust, accumulation of social capital, and universal cooperation. In order to achieve this result, each network must be dense, and collective representations - practices, sentiments, ideas, emotions, jointly enacted and shared - must be periodically recreated and affirmed by means of rituals encompassing all networks members (Rawls 2004: 177-182). This Durkheimian theory emphasizes social capital as a key resource, of all resources present and accessible to actors in a social movement.

The emphasis is in line with some recent literature on resource mobilization, which underscores - in addition to economic and other material resources - also moral, cultural, social organization, and human resources as important for the success of social movements (see Edwards, McCarthy 2004: 125-128; Foley, Edwards, Diani 2001b: 275-279). However, social capital is considered in this case not merely as one of "the properties of the network taken as a whole" (Diani 2004: 351), but rather a crucial resource and network property. The importance of this resource lies in the benefits it brings to actors having access, not just to a social network as emphasized by the literature on social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990: 300-321; Lin 2001: 24-25; Portes 1998: 6), but to several of such networks simultaneously.

The question is then how social movements are able "to generate new ties and solidarities" (Diani 1997: 142; 2001: 218) by establishing outside links with a variety of individual and collective actors. The "structural location of movement actors (individuals and/or organizations) in broader social networks" matters, because it influences the extent to which "social movement actors create new linkages to prospective supporters, the general public, and elites" (Diani 1997: 129-130; see also 2001: 208). These new linkages can be created and maintained through the actors' structural location, even though ceremonies and meetings are performed for the sake of social movement actors only.

In Durkheimian terms, the question is then how two networks, and the two related social forms of consciousness (that of the social movement, and the broader social networks in which it is inserted), may be maintained and brought together

to the advantage of the members of both networks (Pope, Johnson 1983: 683). The distinction between "within group" and "between group" social capital (Edwards, Foley 2001: 12-13) is here relevant as far as social networks, and also frames and forms of consciousness, are concerned. Both forms of consciousness - of the social movement and the larger collectivity to which it is linked - are rational in Durkheim's sense, for their existence presupposes the pursuit of the public good, rather than selfish advantages (Pope, Johnson 1983: 685). However, the publics, and therefore the respective public goods, are different.

Members of successful social movements, and their group as a whole, occupy a central position in relation to other individuals and groups. Centrality, in this sense of the term, involves a great number of such relations (Wasserman, Faust 1994: 178-192). Successful social movements do not form cliques. Cliques, which apparently characterize phases of movement formation only (Diani 1992: 121), prevent the movement from obtaining social and political relevance for society as a whole. Rather, the movement's central position enables it to create social capital as a resource widely available within the social system. The movement's leaders, followers, and sympathizers may activate such links. Ties to outside networks are the more relevant for the movement, the more the existing links sustain a salient identity (Stryker 2000: 28; see also 1981: 23-24) of the potential recruit.

"Leadership with diverse background, skills and viewpoints" (Morris, Staggenborg 2004: 188) are necessary if actual and potential followers belong to different networks. Rational leaders of a social movement would seek to centralize group network ties in order to coordinate collective action (Marwell, Oliver, Prahl 1988). Whatever their personal inclinations and worldviews, they would also refrain from encouraging practices, supporting norms, and advocating values that are generally considered deviant. Further, they would seek to establish and promote a dense network of social movement followers and a common frame.

Extensive external linkages should, moreover, complement integration within the movement, considered as a community (Woolcock 1998: 170, 174-175). According to Durkheim (1998b: 180-181, 193-197, 262-266, and 266-267, note 4), at least some linkages must be multiplex and meaningful to the movement participants to obtain and maintain systemic or "organic" solidarity, in keeping with one meaning of this ambiguous expression (Pope, Johnson 1983). Mere economic outside relations would not be sufficient if the clusters, of which the social structure is composed, are not otherwise related. The multiplex and meaningful character of the links leaders and activists establish with other individuals and groups requires that successful movement perform not only frame alignment with other movements, but also some accommodation to the predominant political culture. This puts the movement in a dilemma.

  A strategy of pursuing opposition and seeking accommodation may be viewed as inconsistent, and ultimately self-defeating. On the one hand, a movement's orientation to conflict and opposition is a condition of effectiveness in changing political culture,. An orientation to conflict may induce followers to commit "rhetorical and physical violence" (Tarrow 1992: 193), which leaders can hardly condemn without losing part of their supporters and diminishing the movement's social and political impact (Piven, Cloward 1992). Condoning or encouraging violence and other disruptive conducts that are incompatible with the predominant political culture may, however, court repression, alienate sympathetic bystanders, bring about the movement's social and moral isolation, and ultimately jeopardize its effectiveness. On the other hand, consensus movements tend to be local, unstable, and amenable to co-optation (McCarthy, Wolfson 1992), therefore unable to transform "quiescence into political action" (Tarrow 1992: 191).

Opposition and consensus movements can therefore be equally ineffective in bringing institutional innovation, and social and cultural change. To achieve these goals, and as a way out of this dilemma, leaders may constitute the movement into a distinct moral community cemented by meetings and ceremonies of its own, and pursue conflict and opposition in relation to the dominant culture. At the same time, though, they should endeavor to avoid all disruptive conduct by keeping followers under firm control; abide by, or at least not infringe, the fundamental values of the dominant culture; and maintain multiplex ties with outside individuals and groups, and encourage followers to do likewise. Conforming to, or at least not infringing, fundamental values involve the movement's integration into society at large.

At the same time, the actors' multiplex connections involve their concatenate relationships with a variety of other groups, with which the movement shares at least some of its members (Wallace 1981: 193, 221-222, 224 note 4) and/or some component of its frame. Concatenation and integration prevent the movement's isolation and ineffectiveness, whereas militant solidarity maintains its cohesion and viability. Reaching the movement's goals is, accordingly, the emerging effect of two nested systems of interdependence of which members are part (Boudon 1981). Social movement organizations may envisage success as depending on the movement's collective action. However, the fact that members and organizations are inserted into a larger context which they can influence, but not control, should induce leaders to consider the whole set of obstacles and opportunities present in other networks, and in social and political institutions. According to this Durkheimian theory, leaders should not only attempt to assess how the movement may take advantage

of opportunities in concrete situations, given a political-institutional context (Kriesi 2004: 78-79). Leaders should be also aware, whatever their aims, that the movement would itself benefit ultimately from the benefits it brings to civil and political society, if leaders and rank-and-file members keep themselves open ideologically and socially to different ideas and groups.

As Durkheim argued, the success of a social movement is predicated on its ability to conform to the movement's contingent goals. It should also conform, however, to the general goal of building and consolidating an institutional order amenable to an ongoing interchange of ideas, beliefs, collective representations and social interactions between individuals, between groups, and between social and political institutions. A movement's contingent goals should be subordinated to this general goal. In the dispute between advocates of strain and breakdown theories on the one hand, resource mobilization theory on the other, Durkheim would have probably sided with the former. Strain theory lays emphasis on structural malintegration of individuals and groups, and therefore on general societal conditions promoting social breakdown (Buechler 2004: 48-51; Ruggero, Montagna 2008: 3-4), while resource mobilization theory concerns itself with the purposive efforts on the part of movement leaders or others to secure resources, and to use them to start and promote collective action (Edwards, McCarthy 2004).

Durkheim's main interest was in the interrelationship between primary groups and social integration. The consolidation of moral density by constituting occupational groups as interrelated primary groups, making them aware of the general interest through their Government regulation, endow them with power or influence on political institutions, maintaining an ongoing interchange between civil and political society, were remedies which did not directly result from the movements' own action or goals. If a "normal" (in the sense of being ideal and desirable) condition of moral density prevails, occupational identity provided by membership in groups was considered by Durkheim compatible with the national identity conferred by citizenship in modern political systems (Nisbet 1974:247-248; Poggi 2003: 187). If oblivious of the public good, broadly defined, social movements such as workers' would - Durkheim argued - weaken solidarity and increase malintegration. Students of social movements should accordingly endeavor to bring into light how a movement's network of connections with institutions and other groups may be related to properties of the whole network of social relations.

A social movement is then not seen as a direct response to social strain. If strain is viewed as a cause of social movements, strain theory has failed to specify the organizations and actors involved in meaningful interactions constitutive of social movements, and the type of collective action allegedly resulting from strain (Buechler 2004: 51, 63-64; Snow, Benford 1992: 135-136). Alternatively, social movements may be seen as producing solidarity as a collective, systemic resource. Movements are, accordingly, successful to the extent that many relations are based on contract, partners have equal power, there is a pronounced division of social labor between individuals and between groups, and the State regulates the functions or activities performed by groups and by social movements in particular.

Illustrations of the Theory: The American Civil Rights Movement, Occupy Wall Street, and Social Democracy in Imperial Germany. Considering the different success (in terms of achieved social density) of these social movements may provide a convenient illustration of this Durkheimian theory. Each movement represents a distinct and influential theoretical tradition in the study of social movements (Della Porta 1996: 328). All of them, moreover, have been the object of scholarly research, which has investigated their success or failure.

The American Civil Rights movement has been generally considered successful, according to a conventional definition of success in terms of the movement's intended impact. Its success, whether so defined or in terms of increased moral density resulting from collective action as here suggested, may be indicated by advancements of the Black minority in several areas (Andrews 1997; 2001; 2004: 57-58, 138, 153-154, 176-177, 195-196; Andrews, Edwards 2004: 497; McAdam 1996: 352-353; Stahura 1986: 141-142). Investigations on the American Civil Rights movement have yielded a number of general statements. Decision to participate in a social movement depend on structural and social-psychological conditions, such as: A) building the movement infrastructure by promoting the emergence of leaders, mobilizing indigenous resources, and creating effective organizations (Andrews 2004), and B) the movement's ability to exploit the potential recruit's integration in some social context by reinforcing that social identity, and linking it to the movement (McAdam, Paulsen 1993).

The literature on the Civil Rights Movement has yielded some conclusions bearing on the reasons of its success, as measured by several indicators. We shall not linger on this literature here (cf. McAdam 1996; Piven, Cloward 1992; Snow, Benford 1992: 148; Tarrow 1992). This Durkheimian theory shares with its conclusions a stress on the importance for successful social movements to: a) build on existing organizations that may be sympathetic with their goals; b) maintain ties to other organizations; c) avoid pronouncements and actions that are generally considered unacceptable; d) to this end, keep firm control on followers. It integrates these statements, however, by adding some propositions. Firstly, general awareness that the movement's frame is not disruptive or deviant may be indispensable to

exert some influence on sectors of the public opinion, and on the political system. Violation of rules and disruption of institutions may well have been the only possible way for powerless people, such as lower-class Blacks, to have their requests responded, if not carried into practice, by representatives of political institutions in the years of the Civil Rights movement", hoping to benefit from the subsequent realignment (Piven, Cloward 1992: 319-321). From a Durkheimian perspective this situation indicates an anomic societal condition, as a significant part of the population had been excluded from civil and political society. Firm control on followers might have been used on the part of the Civil Rights Movement in conjunction with attempts to harness lower-class discontent by increasing its participation in civil society.

Secondly, the literature on the Civil Rights Movement has possibly not given enough consideration to how a social form of consciousness was achieved for the American black minority. A shared worldview, and common norms and values, were created maintained, or strengthened, by means of rituals held in churches by religious ministers, of whom King was the most illustrious representative. In the eyes of the believers, the Civil Rights movement's frame was thereby constituted into a moral and sacred community that ought to be significant to everyone. Finally, multiplex links between the movement organization and organizations of the outside environment were not limited to black religious institutions. The Civil Rights movement's frame was resonant with values held by non-religious, non-black collectivities such as secular liberals and Freedom Summer volunteers (Andrews 1997; 2001: 77, 83-84; Andrews, Edwards 2004: 498; McAdam 1996: 347-348; Morris, Staggenborg 2004).

The formation of self-contained cliques was thus avoided. Further, the presence of a number of other groups was also a relevant factor of success. Members of such groups were not adverse to, if sympathetic with, the movement. The number of followers who were socially distant from other members (therefore more likely to have contacts with indifferent actors, and less exposed to the movement frame) (Gould 1993: 194) was accordingly reduced. The Civil Rights movement's success has been also explained in terms of the network of interpersonal ties of the challenging group (in this case, the movement's leadership) (Kim, Bearman 1997). According to this explanation, the leaders' success depended on their central position in the movement's network, and high level of interest in the collective good. If compared to other members of the Civil Rights movement, leaders were most committed to their cause and most able to mobilize a critical mass of followers, as is generally the case of successful leaders in rebellious regimes (Kim, Bearman 1997: 84-91).

The theory, which has been here proposed, is compatible with this explanation; however, it stresses two further factors of success. Firstly, the leaders' ability to transform this critical mass into a unitary moral community, and preserve it as such, by expressing "militant solidarity in collective action", and creating or reviving to this end "mythical compositions or themes" (Fantasia 2004: 452, 463). Secondly, the leaders' and members' multiplex ties prevented societal fragmentation into a number of socially and therefore morally isolated subgroups, and thereby facilitated the formation of a unitary community.

A movement's success has been here defined both in terms of its preservation, and achievement of cultural, social and political change. With reference to the set of theoretical statements formulated at the beginning of this article, the Civil Rights movement may be considered successful to the extent that it increased the moral density of American society. It did so by establishing strong social and moral bonds between participants; by making use of rituals that had the possibly intended effect to create and maintain integration and solidarity among them; by creating and maintaining meaningful links with other actors, including some representatives of the authorities. On the other hand, the inability of the movement to mobilize the lower class, and to translate mobilization of other segments of the Black minority into lasting social, political and economic gains, limited then, and has subsequently continued to limit, its impact upon American society.

Research conducted in the United States has imputed to social disorganization, and therefore to social isolation and (in Durkheim's language) low moral density, a number of chronic and socially undesirable conditions such as persistent poverty, rampant crime, widespread family breakdown, and unemployment. Social isolation may be found in the American inner cities, and in general in areas "characterized by sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational participation" (Sampson, Groves 1989: 799; see also Massey 1990; Massey, Eggers 1990; Small, Newman 2006). These areas do not form local communities, in the sense of "a complex system of friendship, kinship, and associational networks" (Kasarda, Janowitz 1974: 328). As a consequence, they have little social integration in their own networks, relatively few significant links with society at large, and - as indicators of their anomic condition, in line with this Durkheimian theory - "disproportionately high rates of crime and delinquency" (Sampson, Groves 1989: 799; see also Krivo, Peterson 1996; Peterson, Krivo 1993; 2005: 336-337).

Living in neighborhood, which are thus characterized, produces cumulative effects in a number of social domains and during the entire life course of those who have been exposed to these life conditions (DiPrete, Eirich 2006). What is more, social integration, when present, does not translate into attachment to conventional norms nor, as a consequence,

to high moral density as a systemic (rather than local) property. In socially disorganized areas, integration among juvenile delinquents - as indicated by their friendship relations - is conducive to mutual reinforcement of these relationship, and consequently, to isolation from conforming others (Giordano et al. 1986: 1192-1193). Social integration in areas contiguous to socially disorganized neighborhoods increases the likelihood of crime committed by representatives of such communities as a response to a perceived external threat (Heitgerd, Bursik 1987).

Isolation and fragmentation is not peculiar to American society. They are also found in French society, among the marginal, disorganized, enraged and anomic young inhabitants of disadvantaged urban areas (*loubards*, as they have been called). As in the United States, their presence and behavior have elicited violent responses on the part of other young people who live in communities that feel threatened by social disorganization (Dubet 1987). Their precarious and marginal condition, moreover, and that of the urban areas where they live have prevented an organized political response to processes of ethnic discrimination and exclusion (Lapeyronnie 1987). These negative effects of isolating and discriminating against a given segment of the population in accordance with class and/or ethnic criteria, and the ensuing societal fragmentation, cannot be therefore imputed to specific cultural or historical factors.

The success of the Civil Rights movement has been to some extent responsible for this state of affairs, if success is narrowly defined in terms of its intended impact on the institutions of civil and political society. For, the consensus on the principle of "equal treatment regardless of race" - a main goal of the movement - has failed to prevent "continuing high rates of discrimination" against Blacks and - to a lesser extent - other minorities on the basis of what psychologists have called implicit prejudice (Quillian 2006). It has also increased the physical and social isolation and relative deprivation of Blacks, in comparison to other minorities (Farley, Frey 1994). This process has had undesirable consequences for the Black minority, however.

The physical and social distance between those members of minorities who are middle- or upper class, and those who belong to the lower class, has widened in concomitance with improvements in the minorities' economic and social conditions, Blacks constitute the most economically disadvantaged, segregated and discriminated minority in the United States (Bobo, Zubrinsky 1994: 904-905; Fong, Shibuya 2005: 293; Lee, Bean 2004: 237; Light 2005: 652; Small, Knewman 2001: 26). As for those Blacks who live and/or work with Whites and have reached middle-class status, the frequent experience of "unpleasant encounters of interpersonal or institutional racism" has engendered a "growing sense of frustration and relative deprivation" (Powers, Ellison 1995: 222; see also Feagin 1991: 102, 104-105). Considering the Black ethnic group as a whole, a condition of strain that ensues from severe structural disadvantage may contribute to account for the Blacks' comparatively high identification with their own ethnic group, and for their very low intermarriage rates (Lee, Bean 2004: 229-234).

The Civil Rights Movement has been then, to some extent, instrumental to create new economic and social opportunities for the Black minority. It has not succeeded, however, in overcoming its relative deprivation, or in establishing strong social and moral bonds between members of this minority, and new economic or symbolic links with other groups (either Whites or non-Whites) and American society as a whole. The Civil Rights movement's limited success may be compared to the considerable success, which the Occupy Wall Street movement has obtained in organizing protest against the American financial élite; but it may be also compared to the failure of the Social Democratic movement in Imperial Germany to achieve its aims. As for the Occupy Wall Street movement, recent research has shown the importance of new social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, to create a community of participants, and to increase thereby – using Durkheim's term - society's moral density. The members of this community interact in multiple social contexts, and the networks of their social relations are therefore multiplex, but they share an online communication network. This network has been achieved not only by producing a new informal way of learning. It has also been achieved by promoting in a variety of ways opportunities of participation and interaction between people who differ in their concerns, values, and goals, but who intend nonetheless to achieve greater racial and economic justice. It has also shown the ambivalent effects both of the movement's success, and of its systematic and harsh repression on the part of the authorities. For, success has made its message less amenable to control, and less coherent and clear. As for repression, its effect have been ambivalent, since it has, on the one hand, prevented the movement from establishing a common agenda and a consistent long-term strategy; on the other hand, it has brought about widespread negative reactions in the public at large (Gleason 2013; Hammond 2015; Isquith 2015; Vasi, Suh 2016; Vielen 2014).

The Social Democratic movement, which failed to achieve any major change in its legal, social and cultural environments and in those of German society in general, provides a historical illustration of this Durkheimian theory. The movement failed in spite of some important resources that were available to it. The Social Democratic trade union was well organized and had a very large membership. Also, it could depend as an ally on the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was the greatest party in the Federal Parliament (*Reichstag*) on the eve of World War I. A significant indicator of failure has been considered SPD's vote in favor of the war credits on August 4, 1914, its pacifist tradition

and ideology notwithstanding (Moses 1965; Segre 1978: 220-248; 1981). Among these reasons, historians have emphasized the increasing moderation of the Social Democratic union and party. A number of factors have been indicated among those that may have accounted for the SPD moderation.

In addition to a rising standard of living (Maehl 1952: 27), which however would have possibly produced more militancy (Olson 1963), and did not anyway affect workers after the turn of the century (Mommsen 1970: 66-67), some of these factors were: 1) The union officials' lack of militancy. While unions are not necessarily moderate (Giddens 1973: 208-211), the moderation of social democratic union leaders may have been a consequence of its involvement in daily organizational problems, their stake in material benefits that labor unrest might have jeopardized, and their impregnation with the dominant culture. 2) The union's control on the party and workers. 3) The party's ongoing contacts and collaboration in the pre-war years with the bourgeois parties. 4) The nationalism of the party leaders and rank-and-file. 5) The party leaders' attempt to keep in check the militancy of its left wing for fear of repressive measures on the part of the State authorities (Ascher 1960-1961; Born 1966; Groh 1966; 1973: 580-595; Lidtke 1974; Lowie 1954; Nettl 1965; Roth 1963; Schorske 1955; Weber 1924: 408-409).

At the eve of the First World War the SPD was ready to join a coalition that would have included even the moderate Right (Heckart 1974). Thus, the social democratic movement and party were not able to solve the dilemma between sterile opposition and co-opted consensus, but rather oscillated from one alternative course to the other. They were however isolated, because the respectable part of civil and political society wanted them to be so, and also because this was their own choice. Followers of Social Democracy had their own Press, social circles, and pubs run by sympathetic innkeepers, as Weber observed (Weber 1924: 408). There was little exchange, whether in terms of values or social interactions, with other circles, groups, or institutions (Groh 1973; Nettl 1965; Roth 1963; Sauer 1969). Even faith in Christian religion was transformed into faith in the advent of a socialist paradise (Lidtke 1966a). In this sense, Wilhelmian Germany was then truly "a house divided against itself" (Dorpalen 1955-1956). Multiplex links between Social Democrat individuals and groups had previously been a potential, though not actual, source of strength. At the eve of World War One, they were instead conducive to collective co-optation on the part of representatives of the dominant culture.

As suggested by successful protest movements in France and South Korea in the 1990's, an alternative and possibly more effective way to exert influence on non-Social Democratic organizations, and the public opinion in general, would have been to establish "Direct organizational and symbolic links between the labor movement and various groups of the <excluded>" (Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004: 555), and also with other groups such as students, ethnic communities, religious organizations, and the intelligentsia (Fantasia 2004: 451; Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004: 555), have proved useful to this effect. This did not occur in the Social Democratic movement of Imperial Germany, however. Rather than preserving their values, ideas, sentiments, and networks of social relations, and nonetheless maintaining ongoing ideological and social relations to other groups within the national community, Social Democrats Parliamentary leaders with their votes relinquished their own, and their movement's, distinct identity. By becoming a consensus movement, they merged into a social state of consciousness that was not theirs, and to which they had not contributed.

Summary and Conclusion. This work has reconsidered Durkheim's work for the purpose of formulating a theory, which draws from RCT and network theory, and is related to frame and resource mobilization theories. This Durkheimian theory has pursued two goals. *Firstly*, it has aimed to indicate the conditions and consequences of a social state of consciousness, namely, a set of moral and religious beliefs and practices shared by all members of a social group. Following a discussion of various assessments of the relationship between Durkheimian sociology and RCT, a unitary theoretical framework has been outlined. Multiplex relations between actors forming interconnected clusters have been related to a social state of consciousness. Its creation and conservation depend on the existence of collective sentiments and ideas, which are constitutive of this state of consciousness, are interpreted according to unitary frames that resonate with other frames, and are expressed at regular times in special ceremonial occasions. If applied to the study of social movements, this Durkheimian theory emphasizes the importance, for the success of the movement, of the leaders and activists' own social state of consciousness, and multiplex ties to other networks. The movement's opposition to the dominant culture should not, however, make the movement incompatible with it. Movement leaders should accordingly avoid, on the one hand, isolation and radical contraposition, on the other hand, giving up their identity and become a consensus movement. The examples of the Civil Rights and Occupy Wall Street Movements and Social Democracy in Imperial Germany illustrate and support these statements.

  Secondly, this Durkheimian theory has sought to integrate the conclusions reached by investigations on social movements conducted in agreement with frame and network theories. As for frame theory, it has stressed the problems social movements face as a consequence of the simultaneous presence of the movements' own frames and other frames, especially those produced by the dominant culture. As for network theory, it has emphasized the dual and opposed risks for any movements of isolation, or merging into a larger social network. Successful movements maintain social and

cultural exchanges with outside groups, and have an ongoing dialogue with social institutions. They are, furthermore, interested in gaining new individuals and groups, cultivate multiplex ties to this end, and strive to have sympathetic, or at least not hostile, bystanders. Still, they are not willing to sacrifice their core values and collective identity, and are therefore determined to remain oppositional groups.

A number of related questions are open to further investigations. In particular: A) Is social integration more furthered by multiplexity of ties, or rather by a great number of interconnected subgroups within the same network? Multiplexity of ties may be found in societies with but a few subgroups, while a great number of subgroups may be present in societies in which there is only a relatively small proportion of multiplex ties. Though Durkheim contended that simple ties (as instantiated by economic exchanges between enemies) are not conducive as such to social integration and moral density, this contention is not self-evident. B) Are multiplex and dense relations, or rather periodical gatherings endowed with symbolic significance, more effective in promoting a social state of consciousness? Exploring this question may shed light on a dilemma which leaders of social movements face, that is, whether their foremost task is to enlarge and strengthen the movement's social capital, or to develop a master frame that provides a collective identity to the followers, and resonates with other frames. C) Given a dilemma between alternative courses of action available to social movement leaders - namely, to focus on the development of "within group" or "between group" social capital - which strategy seems to be more successful other conditions being equal? The former strategy may eventuate in a compact, but relatively isolated movement; the latter in a movement that is well connected with its environment (other individuals and subgroups) both in terms of social relations and ideological frame, but lacks inner cohesiveness.

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